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The promoter is the creative force of the corporate enterprise,
for corporations do not spring into being spontaneously. They
result logically from planning and preliminary operations on the
part of promoters. A Massachusetts judge has said, making
vivid his opinion by poetic expression, "The corporation is in the
hands of the promoter like clay in the hands of the potter." I
The promoter undertakes to form and set going a company in
reference to a particular project.2 As was stated in an English
case, "the term promoter is a term not of law, but of business,
usefully summing up, in a single word, a number of business
operations familiar to the commercial world, by which a com-
pany is generally brought into existence." 3 When the corpora-
tion does achieve legal existence, the promoter frequently con-
tinues as its directing mind. The natural continuity and the
logical identity between the corporation and the promoter is the
influence which permeates and colors the law relative to promot-
ers' contracts.
The promoter's efforts are largely devoted to making con-
tracts on behalf of the proposed corporation, which it may ignore
or refuse to sanction, or by which it may become bound after its
I Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 187, 89 N. E. 193,
206 (1909).
2 First Avenue Land Co. v. Hildebrand, 103 Wis. 530, '79 N. W. 7/53
(1899).
3 Whaley Bridge Co. v. Green, 5 Q. B. D. 109, 111 (1879). For other
cases containing definitions of term "promoter" see Armstrong v. Sun Print-
ing Ass'n, 137 App. Div. 828, 830, 122 N. Y. Supp. 531, 532 (2d Dep't
1910); Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U. S. 181, 203, 20 Sup. Ct.
311, 319 (1900); Wheal Ellen Gold Mining Co. v. Read, 7 Austr. C. L. R.




organization. These contracts are in their very nature anoma-
lous for although the promoter is a party to the contract, per-
formance is not expected of him, nor is he acting for any exist-
ing principal. The courts in interpreting and enforcing these
agreements have made a sincere attempt to effect justice, and, at
the same time, with rather disastrous results, to adapt contract
law to tle unusual situations involved. Since crystallized law
has frequently no application, it is difficult to regard the deci-
sions as precedents, for they seem predicated primarily on the
facts, and only secondarily on the law. Resorting to rules of
law in these cases, particularly in this country, is an afterthought
necessary to sustain and place them in some recognized category.
It is the purpose of this article to analyze and illustrate the
promoter's and the corporation's rights and liabilities under con-
tracts made on behalf of corporations to be organized.
PROMOTERS' RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES ON CONTRACTS MADE ON
BEHALF OF PROPOSED CORPORATIONS
The proposed corporation until it achieves legal existence is
obviously unable to contract, either through promoters or other
agents. The reasoning in the general run of cases is somewhat
as follows: An agent without a principal is a patent absurdity,'
and if he assumes to act for a principal when in fact he has none,
he is individually liable. Since the promoter acts for the cor-
poration before its organization, he is under the general rule of
agency responsible as principal on contracts of this character.,
If this were not so, agreements made by him on behalf of future
corporate enterprises would be altogether inoperative until
adopted by the corporation.6 Since the promoter is usually held
4 Buffington v. Bardon, 80 Wis. 635, 639, 50 N. W. 776 (1891): "The law
is that a corporation is liable for its own acts only after it has a legal
existence. Until that time, no one whether a promoter or not can sustain
to the corporation the relation of agent. Were this not so, we would have
an agent without a principal, which is an absurdity."
5 Weiss v. Baum, 218 App. Div. 83, 217 N. Y. Supp. 820 (2d Dep't 1926)
-a case involving promoters' contracts. "The proposition presented here
does not appear to have been decided in this State, but the principles in-
velving the personal liability of one assuming to act as agent for a non-
existent principal or claiming a power of agency without authority, have
been frequently set forth. Speaking in a case where the defendant exe-
cuted a note in the name of another without authority, Judge Selden, In
White v. Madison, 26 N. Y. 117, 123, pointed out that prior decisions in
this State supporting such liability have been regarded by the courts as
'substantially repudiated,' adding: 'If it were necessary, in disposing of
the present case, to decide the question, whether, as a general principle, one
entering into a contract in the name of another, without authority, is to
be himself holden as a party to the contract, I should hesitate to affirm such
a principle. By that rule courts would often make contracts for parties
which neither intended nor would have consented to make."'
6 Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 174, 183 (1866).
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bound by these contracts, it logically follows, according to well
established principles, that even after the contract becomes the
corporation's, he cannot, in the absence of a novation, be released
from its obligations."
The situation would be a simple one if the rules in regard to
the promoter's liability could be so authoritatively and definitely
summarized. Fairness and business usage, however, frequently
demand otherwise. Rules applying and restating the general
premises of the law of contract are not ordinarily applicable to
the promoter's case, for he is in a different position from the
ordinary party to a contract. The persons who contract with
him gamble on the ability of the proposed corporation to per-
form, and expect little except good faith from the promoter.
Certainly they do not anticipate performance by the promoter,
and once the contract becomes the corporation's, it is substituting
a legal theory for the intention of the parties to continue to hold
him liable on the contract. The courts have recognized this, and
the decisions reveal exceptions and qualifications, which nullify
the value of the application of general principles of contract law
to promoters' agreements.
A leading English case,8 cited extensively by our courts, states
the logical and orthodox principle in reference to the promoter's
liability on contracts made for future corporations. There the
plaintiff, addressing the defendant promoters "on behalf of
the proposed Gravesend Royal Alexandra Hotel Co., Ltd.,"
offered to sell his extra stock of liquor. The acceptance of the
offer was signed by the defendants, adding the same description
after their names. The liquor was accepted and consumed in the
hotel business, and the directors by a resolution made at a meet-
ing prior to complete incorporation specifically ratified the con-
tract. The hotel corporation was subsequently organized and
became insolvent. After the suit was brought, the completely
organized corporation again ratified the contract. The court, in
holding the defendants individually liable, said: "But as there
was no corporation in existence at the time, the agreement would
be wholly inoperative, unless it was held to be binding on the
defendants personally. The cases referred to in the course of
the argument fully brought out the proposition that where a
contract was signed by one who professes to be signing as 'agent,'
but who has no principal existing at the time, and the contract
would be wholly inoperative unless binding upon the person who
signed it, he is bound thereby; and a stranger cannot by subse-
quent ratificaion relieve him from that responsibility." Cer-
tainly, reasoned the court, the defendants did not intend that
the liquor would only be paid for if the corporation was organ-
?Bonsall v. Platt, 153 Fed. 126, 129 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907).
s Kelner v. Baxter, supra note 6.
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ized, particularly as payment was promised on a definite date.
Under the authority of this case, therefore, unless and until
there is a novation, the promoter is held to continue liable on his
contracts made on behalf of proposed corporations. Many cases
in our own courts set forth this principle with equal strictness.0
They proceed upon the arbitrary premise that the law assures
persons dealing with promoters of corporations to be formed
the double security of the promoter and of the corporation, un-
less a definite intention to" the contrary can be shown.10
This theory is predicated .on such-clear and obvious legal prin-
ciples, that it hardly needs illustration. In Ennis Cotton-Oil Co.
v. Burks," the promoters and the corporation were joined as
parties defendant. The agreement, under which the goods were
delivered, was made with the promoter of the corporation, and
was subsequently adopted by it. The court said that the pro-
moter was not discharged by the adoption of the agreement, for
liability attached to him when the contract was made, and he
was not released therefrom. Both the corporation and the pro-
moter were held liable on the agreement. It was also decided
that where the corporation had entered into a new agreement
with the plaintiff for goods, it was alone liable thereon. In Mt.
Pleasant Coal Co. v. Watts, 2 the promoters agreed with the
plaintiff that they would form a corporation to take over a lease
of coal lands which he owned, and that in consideration of the as-
signment the corporation would employ him as mine boss for life,
and issue to him a specified amount of stock. The corporation
took over the lease, but failed to transfer the stock, and dis-
charged the plaintiff. The corporation and the promoters were
joined as defendants. The court held that the promoters were
not released from their liability on the contract, although adopted
by the corporation, for nothing short of a novation could effect
this result. These decisions are apparently contradictory to the
real meaning of the agreement of the parties, for there is nothing
in the facts to indicate any intention to bind the promoters in-
dividually.
It is interesting to note that in a Porto Rican case,", the court
stretched the orthodox rule to effect justice instead of to defeat
9 Wells v. Fay & Egan Co., 143 Ga. 732, 85 S. E. 873 (1915); Garnett v
Richardson, 35 Ark. 144 (1879); Ennis Cotton-Oil Co. v. Burks, 39 S. W.
966 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897); Lewis v. Fisher, 167 Mo. App. 674, 157 S. W.
172 (1912) ; O'Rorke v. Geary, 207 Pa. 240, 56 Atl. 541 (1903). See supra
note 7.
10 Carle v. Corhan, 127 Va. 223, 103 S. E. 699 (1920) ; Strause v. Rich-
mond Woodworking Co., 109 Va. 724, 65 S. E. 659 (1909).
1 Supra note 9.
12 151 N. E. 7 (Ind. App. 1926) ; see also Thistle v. Jones, 45 Misc. 215,
92 N. Y. Supp. 113 (County Ct. 1904).
' Crane v. Bennett, 3 P. R. 185 (1907).
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it. There the defendants induced the plaintiff to bring his
mother to Porto Rico, representing that he would be made joint
superintendent of their plantation, and that they would give him
a house to live in. He, in turn, was to contribute $4,000 toward
the development of the plantation, for which he was to receive
an interest in the property. Later the plaintiff, a young man
obviously unschooled in business matters, consented to the sub-
stitution of a corporation for the defendant partners as the
owners of the land, and to take stock, instead of an interest in
the property itself, for his cash contribution. Before signing
the contract, the plaintiff noticed that it contained nothing about
his appointment as joint superintendent of the property, and
when he called this to the defendants' attention, they told him
that was understood. He never received the house, the stock
or his position. The court held both the promoters and the cor-
poration liable, in spite of the fact that the plaintiff had con-
sented to the substitution of the corporation for the defendants.
The facts indicated that the corporate fiction was merely used
to defeat the plaintiff's claim. This the court would not permit,
although the accepted technique and convention of judicial rea-
soning prevented it from stating this in so many words as the
ground for its decision. Instead it was held judicially that the
only manner in which the promoters could be released was by
a definite agreement by the plaintiff to look to the corporation
ahlne for redress.
Although the foregoing decisions illustrate the general ortho-
dox rule as to the promoter's liability, it has been relaxed in
many cases where the contract has been adopted by the corpo-
ration.
The equities of the situation are somewhat different where the
plan to form the corporation fails. There the promoter is almost
invariably held liable on his contracts with third parties, a salu-
tary rule where the third party has parted with value, for with-
out it the contract would be inoperative, and he would be remedi-
less. There are two different types of situations which give rise
to this responsibility: where the promoter represents himself
as acting for an existing corporation, which, in fact, has never
been formed,14 and where the promoter frankly states to the third
party that he is representing a corporation which he proposes
to organize. The decision in the first type of case rests on clear
definite reasoning. The promoter is liable in these cases on his
implied warranty of corporate existence. This responsibility
1See Seeberger v. McCormick, 178 Ill. 404, 53 N. E. 340 (1899) ; Kaiser
v. Lawrence Savings Bank, 56 Iowa 104, 8 N. W. 772 (1881); Abbott v.
Omaha Smelting & Refining Co., 4 Neb. 416 (1876); Wectselberg v. Flour
City National Bank, 64 Fed. 90 (C. C. A. 7th, 1894).
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rests on the same ground as that of the person who assumes to
act as agent for a principal whom he does not represent."
In Harrill v. Davis,16 the promoters purchased lumber and
other materials of the plaintiff in the name of a non-existent
corporation, the organization of which was never completed, for
the certificate was not filed as required by statute. Although
the plaintiff delivered the merchandise to what he assumed was
the contracting corporation and intended to extend credit to it,
the court held the promoters liable because "they represented
themselves to be a corporation, when they knew they were not."
Hurt v. Salisbury 17 also illustrates this principle. The note in
suit was signed by the promoters assuming to act as directors of
a corporation in process of formation. The only remaining step
necessary to complete incorporation was to file a copy of the
articles of association with the secretary of state. The promot-
ers were held liable on the note as partners, for, said the court,
it was their duty to prove that their principal had a legal exist-
ence.
In cases where the promoter negotiates contracts with parties,
openly as an apparent link toward the formation of a new cor-
poration, and the company is never organized, he is usually
chargeable. He is responsible both for his failure to organize
the corporation and also as if he had contracted in his individual
capacity. In a leading. case in New York, Kirschmann v. Lediard
& Ree,18 the plaintiff agreed to assign a patent to a corporation
which was to be organized by the defendants, for which the cor-
poration was to pay him cash and stock. The defendants failed
to form the corporation. The court held the promoters liable
for breach of their contract to incorporate, the damages being
determined by the putative value of the stock. Heisen v. Church-
ill I' also illustrates this principle. There the evidence showed
that the plaintiff clearly understood, when entering into the con-
tracts in suit, that the defendant promoter had acted for a cor-
poration in process of formation. Incorporation was never ef-
fected, as the promoter failed to fife the certificate of incorpora-
tion in the required offices. It was the plaintiff's obligation, said
the court, to organize the corporation properly, and to take every
necessary step incidental to its formation, and failing to do this,
he could not interpose the corporate liability in defense of his
own personal responsibility.
15 See supra notes 5 and 9. Where the promoter acts for a future cor-
poration, as if it were existing and doing business, there can, of course, be
no doubt of his liability.
16 168 Fed. 187 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909).
1755 Mo. 310 (1874).
18 61 Barb. 573 (N. Y. 1872).
19 205 Fed. 368 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913).
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The Kirschmann 2o case, incidentally, is interesting also, for it
indicates the measure of damages in an action against a promoter
for failure to organize a corporation, particularly if the plaintiff
is to be paid in stock. The value of the stock in such cases may
be shown by a variety of circumstances, such as the assets of the
corporation, its debts, its capitalization, and the possibilities of
its business. All these factors are for consideration by the
jury.:21 Proof may of course be made that the stock would be
worthless.-
As was stated at the outset, however, the rule holding the pro-
moter liable on contracts for future corporations has exceptions.
Most of these relate to cases where the contemplated corporation
has been formed and is held for any one of a number of reasons
bound by the contract. The promoter has, however, rather con-
fusingly been held free from liability, even where the corpora-
tion has not been organized. In an Arkansas case,23 the plaintiff
leased a photographic machine to the defendant promoter, spe-
cifically described in the contract as agent and trustee for a pro-
posed corporation. The machine was delivered, but it was under-
stood that payment was to be made on a certain future date or
earlier, upon the company's organization. The plaintiff knew
that incorporation was contingent upon the receipt of $20,000 in
stock subscriptions. As this was not accomplished, the corpora-
tion was never organized and payment was not made to the
plaintiff, although it was past the date fixed in the contract.
It was held that the promoter was not liable on the lease, for
his undertaking was to act for a disclosed principal when it came
into existence. This decision is not in accordance with the gen-
eral rules of law, but it is sustained by the equity of the situation,
for the plaintiff himself was a subscriber to the stock, and know-
ingly assumed the risk of a possible failure to incorporate when
he delivered the machine to the defendant. The contract did not
provide that the defendant was to be liable only if the corpora-
tion was organized, so that under the form of the contract, as
the court concedes, there would ordinarily be no doubt as to the
defendant's liability, for similarly worded instruments are con-
strued as absolute obligations to pay on the date fixed or earlier
on the happening of the specified contingency.
A somewhat similar Alabama case 24 is most radical in holding
the promoter harmless on his contract. There a traveling sales-
man, representing the plaintiff printing company, solicited an
order for stationery and fixtures from the promoters of a na-
2 0 See supra note 18.
21 Crichfield v. Julia, 147 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906).
22 Eisenmayer v. Leonardt, 148 Cal. 596, 84 Pac. 43 (190G).
23 Belding v. Vaughan, 108 Ark. 69, 157 S. W. 400 (1913).
24 McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Head, 7 Ala. App. 384, 62 So. 287 (1913).
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tional bank. The order was placed with the approval of a board
of directors elected for the future bank. The merchandise was
charged and shipped to "The National City Bank," just as if its
organization had been perfected. The venture was abandoned
as a result of a disagreement between the parties, and the sub-
scriptions to the stock were repaid. The court in holding the
promoters free from liability on the contract based its decision
on the fact that both parties knew that the bank was non-exist-
ent, and that the plaintiff never expected payment from the in-
dividuals. The court, reasoning in a matter-of-fact and business-
like manner said:
"The state of facts, disclosed by the evidence that the case
presented, was that of a dealer who was so eager to make
disposition of his wares, and so confident from the impres-
sion made on him by the situation as it really existed, that
the proposition for the establishment of a bank had pro-
gressed so far that it would be consummated as planned
that he undertook, on the mere approval of his offer by
those who were expected to be in charge of the affairs of
the bank when it should come into existence, to supply the
stationery which it would need and to look to it alone for
the payment of, the price, without suggesting or requiring
that those who acted in behalf of the proposed bank, or any
of them, should incur any personal liability for the articles
to be furnished. If a party merely speculates on the chance
of being paid by a corporation not yet in existence, and has
no claim in contract or in tor against those with whom
dealing was had, the latter cannot be held to liability merely
because the plan to organize a corporation was not carried
out."
This is an extreme case of its type, and the correctness of the
decision may well be questioned. Ordinarily where promoters
assume to contract for a proposed corporation, and it is never
organized, they are liable in any event on the theory that it is
their obligation to bring about incorporation and the adoption
of the contract by the corporation. If they contract with third
parties and accept delivery of goods from them, it seems only
fair that the risk that the corporation may not be formed should
be theirs, and not the third party's, even if the latter is advised
of the exact state of affairs.
Weiss v. Baum 2 is a case decided on a similar theory. It in-
volved an action for the specific performance of a contract for
the purchase of real property against Baum, one of the promoters
of a projected real estate corporation. At the time the contract
was made the sellers understood that the purchase was made on
behalf of a corporation in process of formation. In fact the
25 Supra note 5. See also Branning Mfg. Co. v. Norfolk-Southern R. R.,
138 Va. 43, 121 S. E. 74 (1924).
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agreement was signed, "Ruth Realty Corp. by Charles Baum."
The court held that the case did not come within the rule which
holds an agent personally liable because acting for a non-existent
principal. The basis of this liability is that the agent warrants
his authority, while in the case under consideration it was clearly
understood that Baum was not the purchaser, and that the cor-
poration which he represented was non-existent. It was the in-
tention of the seller to hold the real estate corporation and not the
defendant, and to charge him as vendee would be the maling of
a new contract by the court. Specific performance against the
defendant was consequently refused.
Of course the promoter may, at the outset, tell the third party:
"You must look to the corporation, which is to be formed, for
performance of this contract, and I am in no event to be held
responsible." There are few cases in which the agreement ex-
empting the promoter from liability is as clear as this, but the
courts have spelled out this intention from a number of different
situations. The classic case on this point is an English one.
Wheeler v. Fradd 2 1 involved a loan of £1000 made by the plain-
tiff, which it was agreed was to be used in connection with a
business which the defendant contracted to purchase. The con-
tract provided that the plaintiff was to receive a bonus of £1000,
the sum of £2000, the amount of the loan plus the bonus, to be
paid to the plaintiff "as and when I receive payment from the
company.". The underwriting of the corporation failed, and it
was never registered. In holding that the plaintiff could not
recover, the court said that the defendant did his best to effect
the proposed incorporation, which was all he undertook, and re-
payment was expressly conditioned upon the receipt of payment
from the corporation by the defendant. Straouse v. Richmonzd
Woodworking Co. -7 is an interesting case on this point. When
the contract here was signed "M. M. Strause for American Shock
Binding Company," that corporation had not yet been organized.
The shockbinders contracted for were delivered and billed to the
company and partly paid for by it, and the evidence disclosed
that it was fully understood by the plaintiff that Strause was
acting for a corporation in process of being organized. There
was no definite clause in the contract relieving the promoter
from liability. The court held that in spite of the form of the
contract and the general rule of agency which has been applied
to promoters,28 the question of whether there was an intention
to hold the promoter should have been submitted to the jury,
stating:
2. 14 T. L. R. 302 (1898).
27109 Va. 724, 65 S. E. 659 (1909).
28 Supra note 9.
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"The general rule as to a promoter's liability cannot in
reason or fair dealing be carried to the extent of holding him
liable in the face of his contract against liability, fairly and
legally entered into."
There are also decisions which proceed on a closely related
theory. Where the evidence shows that the contracting party
intended to extend credit to the proposed corporation, and not to
the promoter individually, the latter is held free from liability,
particularly where the corporation has been organized. In a
recent Virginia case,29 notes signed "American Theatre, Inc."
by its president and secretary were given to the plaintiff in
payment for real property. The Theatre Corporation was not
in fact organized at the time, and the makers of the notes here
sued were its promoters, who, it was clear, were acting for a
corporation in process of formation. Although the court stressed
the orthodox rule that the persons dealing with promoters are
ordinarily entitled to the double security of the promoters and
the corporation, it decided that if it appears from the evidence
that the contract was made solely on behalf of, and credit was
extended solely to, a corporation which was then being organized
and which shortly thereafter did procure its charter, the rule's
application fails, and the promoters are not liable on the
contract.
In Marconi Telegraph Co. v. Cross'0 the agreement provided
that the Marconi Telegraph Company was to install its system
in Hawaii and adjacent islands. The agreement was made with
the defendant promoter, but the clear understanding was that a
corporation was to be formed to which the contract was to be
assigned. This was done, and the corporation assumed the con-
tract and made payments thereunder. Subsequently certain
difficulties arose with the system, and the stockholders of the
corporation were loath to continue advancing money under the
contract. The plaintiff thereupon sued the defendant promoter,
claiming that he was personally liable. The court in deciding in
the defendant's favor held that the facts came within one of the
exceptions to the general rule, for both parties knew that the
agreement was to be assumed by the corporation, and credit was
extended solely on that basis.
Although these cases effect justice, they are deviations from
the general rule. The ratiocination of the decisions, it is true,
that credit was extended to the corporation and not to the pro-
moter, might justifiably be applied to every case in which a con-
tract is made with a promoter avowedly representing a future
corporation. Rarely, if ever, is there a conscious intention to
29 Carle v. Corhan, 127 Vv. 223, 103 S. E. 699 (1920).
30 16 Hawaii 390 (1905). To the same effect see Esper v. Miller, 131
Mich. 334, 91 N. W. 613 (1902).
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hold the promoter.l1 The promoter should only be held liable
if that was the intention of the parties, or if it can be fairly im-
plied that he agreed to organize a corporation to take over his
obligations, or if he acted in bad faith. A person who contracts
with a promoter, and to whom the facts are fully disclosed,
ordinarily does so at his own risk, for his undertding usually
is to keep his offer open for acceptance by the corporation when
it is organized, and the promoter's intended obligation ordin-
arily is only to use his best efforts to organize the corporation
and to effect the acceptance of the third party's offer by it.
Of course where it appears that the promoters and the corpo-
ration are in fact identical, and the corporate fiction is used by
the individuals only as a convenient pretext to avoid liability,
the promoters should be held liable. A federal case illustrates
this .3 Bonsall, individually, employed Platt to manage his busi-
ness, with the understanding that if the business succeeded Platt
would be fairly compensated. Thereafter Bonsall organized a
corporation to take over the business. He was sole stockholder
and Plat was an officer. Platt, the plaintiff, continued working
in the same capacity. Failing to receive proper compensation,
he brought an action against Bonsall for services performed sub-
sequent to incorporation. The defendant attempted to shield
himself from responsibility by claiming that the corporation
alone was liable. The court held that the plaintiff could properly
hold Bonsall on the original agreement, stating:
"Evidently the organization of the corporation, in which
the defendant owned all the stock, was merely a convenient
and proper method adopted by him for carrying on his busi-
ness .... We cannot accede to the proposition that an in-
dividual having large business interests, who employs agents
to carry on his business, can relieve himself of his individual
responsibility for their services merely by creating a corpo-
ration and causing them to be chosen as officers. In order
to establish such a claim of change of liability, there must
also be evidence of a novation, either express or implied."
To hold in all cases that the promoters can only be discharged
by a novation is too strict and frequently disregards the parties'
intentions, 3 if the term "novation" is used in its accepted legal
sense.34 Professor Williston,33 it is true, is of the opinion that,
31 A reading of the cases cited in the notes in this article demonstrates
this. See supra notes 9, 12, 14.3
.Bonsall v. Platt, supra note 7. Cf. McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Head,
supra note 24.
33 See supra notes 9 and 12.
34 Novation is the "substitution of a new obligation for an old one which
is thereby extinguished"-3 BoUia's LAW DicrIoNAnIY (1897) 2375.
Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co., 59 Mont. 469, 197 Pac. 1005 (1921),
a case involving promoters' contracts, contains a definition of "novation,"
with especial reference to these agreements.
35 1 WLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 306.
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by assenting to the promoter's contract, the corporation agrees
to take the place of the promoter, a change of parties to which
the other party to the contract consented in advance, and that
consequently there would be a novation by which the promoter
would be discharged when the corporation assumed the obliga-
tion. Under this theory, whenever a corporation became bound
on a promoter's contract, there would be a novation, and the pro-
moter would be released.
Van Vieden v. Welles 36 is an application of the principle ex-
pounded by Professor Williston. There the plaintiff was a min-
ister permanently employed by agreement of the deacons of a
church prior to its organization. Subsequently he served in
his capacity for the deacons and later for the corporation and
accepted a salary from each in turn until his discharge. He then
claimed that the individuals, with whom he had made the orig-
inal contract, were liable for his salary. The court held that the
defendants were not chargeable, for the facts showed a waiver
of the original contract, and the church-corporation, instead of
the deacons, became the plaintiff's debtor. In short, there was
a novation.
In Bradshaw v. Jones,37 the plaintiff was employed by the pro-
moters of a railroad company to procure subsidies from land-
owners and residents along the proposed route. At the time the
railroad company was organized, nothing had been done by him
on his contract, and all his services were performed for the rail-
road after incorporation had been perfected. The court, in ef-
fect, said that the promoters were not liable under these facts,
because by working for the railroad, the plaintiff released the
promoters. This is another case which applies Professor Willis-
ton's theory.
The discussion so far has concerned itself with actions for
damages against promoters on their contracts for projected cor-
porations. The question arises as to whether it is possible for
the third party to enforce these contracts specifically as against
the promoter. For example, is it possible for the third party to
compel the promoter to organize a corporation by means of a
decree in specific performance? Obviously this question must be
answered in the negative. It is difficult to conceive of a situation
where the terms and details of the corporate organization are
sufficiently definite to enable the court to decree its organization
in specific terms.
Brown v. Swarthout 38 illustrates this. The defendants agreed
to assign patents and to make tests for a proposed corporation,
of which they were to receive one-fourth of the stock, and the
36 6 Johns. 85 (N. Y. 1810).
37152 S. W. 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
38134 Mich. 585, 96 N. W. 951 (1903).
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balance was to go to the promoters. The amount of the capitali-
zation was not provided for in the contract. When the defend-
ants refused to proceed with the agreement, the plaintiff pro-
moters sought to compel them to perform it. The court said that
the action was not tenable because the contract lacked mutuality,
since the defendants could not have compelled the plaintiffs to
organize the corporation by court order. The contract was not
sufficiently definite to permit this, for there was no provision
in the contract fixing the amount of the capital stock.
Even if the promoter's contract definitely outlines the terms
upon which the corporation is to be organized, so that the court
might compel incorporation, still it is doubtful whether the
courts would decree specific performance. The court's judgment
could only provide for the organization of the corporation, but
could not force the corporation to function. Incorporation,
therefore, by court order would be a meaningless gesture.
The much abused promoter, who so often is held responsible
where liability was never intended, seems, if the reported deci-
sions are any criterion, to have brought action but infrequently
against the third party on contracts made for proposed corpora-
tions. Of course, if before the corporation has become bound by
the agreement the person with whom the promoter contracts
refuses to perform, the promoter should be allowed an action for
damages. Abbott v. Hapgood,39 a leading Massachusetts case,
contains one of the rare decisions in reference to this situation.
The contract here was made by the plaintiffs in the name of
"Penn Match Co. Ltd. of Philadelphia." Under this agreement
the defendants contracted to deliver certain machines to the
Penn Match Co. Ltd. of Philadelphia, which the defendants alone
could furnish, the plaintiffs informing them that the factory
was to be built and the corporation to be organized only if the
machines were received. The defendants refused to deliver the
machines. An action in the name of the projected corporation
was dismissed and subsequently the promoters sued for breach of
the contract. One of the defenses interposed was that the con-
tract was not with the plaintiffs individually. The court said
that the defendants, when they made the contract, must have
understood that the corporation was only projected, and that the
plaintiffs as general partners were the only parties who could do
business with them in the manner proposed. The plaintiffs as-
sumed the name of Penn latch Co. Ltd. as that under which
they chose to do business until the corporation was formed. The
defendants were, under their agreement, bound to deliver the
machinery to the promoters, who could recover the damages
due to the defendants' preventing them from establishing the
corporate business under as favorable auspices, and with as
9 150 Mass. 248, 22 N. E. 907 (1889).
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scientific equipment as would have been the case had the de-
fendants performed their contract. This is a rather unusual
case, for the contract, it will be noted, was made in the Penn
Match Company's name, to which the machines, by the terms
thereof, were to be delivered. The court based its decision in
part on the Massachusetts rule in regard to promoters' agree-
ments: that in no event could the corporation have become a
party to the contract, and the contract must have been intended
to be binding. However, some other court might have rendered
a contrary decision, stating that the contract contemplated per-
formance by the corporation only, and the contract was made
with the promoters acting for it, when it should come into
existence.
It has been decided that if after the corporation has adopted
the contract the third party fails to perform, the promoter can-
not bring action for the breach of the agreement. 40 The reason-
ing here was that the contract was intended to inure solely to
the benefit of the proposed corporation, a corollary to the rule
sometimes applied which exempts promoters from liability on
agreements made for projected corporations, on the ground that
credit was extended to, and performance was expected only of,
the company.
RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF CORPORATIONS ON CONTRACTS
M ADE ON THEIR BEHALF BY PROMOTERS
The organized corporation is the culmination of the promoter's
hopes, but until it is formed, it is "of such stuff as dreams are
made of," and cannot contract. When the corporation finally
emerges from the confusion of pre-organization plans, negotia-
tions and sanguine promises, what is its position with reference
to the contracts which the promoter has assumed to make with
the conviction that they will become the company's? In what
manner can it become bound by these contracts?
Mere incorporation does not of itself affect the promoter's
contracts. In order to render them binding on the corporation,
it must take some affirmative action indicating its assent. The
courts of this country have formulated no precise rule as to the
character of this assent. In England, on the contrary, the pre-
ponderance of judicial opinion seems to hold that the corpora-
tion cannot make itself liable on agreements of this kind except
by making a new contract on the same terms as that entered into
by the promoter.41
40 Wiley v. Borough of Towanda, 26 Fed. 594 (W. D. Pa. 1886).
41 Melhado v. Porto Alegre, 43 L. J. 253 (1874); In re English & Colonial
Produce Co., [1906] 2 Ch. 435; North Sydney Invest. & Tramway Co. v.
Higgins, [1899] A. C. 263; In re Dale & Plant, Ltd., 61 L. T. (N. s.) 206
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The English judicial attitude toward the problem of promot-
ers' contracts contrasts strongly with that of the American
courts.42 Here the corporation may become bound on agreements
of this type in one of a number of ways, and the primary inquiry
in most cases is, was it the intention of the corporation to be
bound by the contract. If such an intention can reasofiably be
inferred, the courts are quick to find a theory within recognized
legal categories to sustain the corporation's liability."3
An analysis of the English cases shows how logical and tradi-
tionally legal is their reasoning. In fact, the court often de-
plores the result of the law's application, but holds itself power-
less to remedy it.
Falcke v. Scottish Imperiaol Insuranwe Co.,4" although not a
case in which the law of promoters' contracts was involved, con-
tains a dictum which reflects the attitude of the English courts
toward the possibility of the adoption of these agreements by
the organized corporation. The court said:
"There is nothing more vague than the way in which the
word 'adoption' is used in arguments of law, and sometimes
the ambiguous language used about 'adoption' is imported
into arguments about ratification. There is no such thing
in law as 'adoption' or 'ratification' of anything except of
some act which purports to be done for or on a man's be-
(1889); In re National Motor Mail Coach Co., 77 L. J. 790 (1908); Falche
v. Scottish Imp. Ins. Co., 56 L. J. 707 (1886); Natal Co. v. Pauline,
[1904] A. C. 120; Gunn v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 12 C. B. (,*I. S.)
694 (1866); In re Empress Engineering Co., 16 Ch. D. 125 (1880); Bagot
Pneumatic Tire Co. v. Clipper Co., [1902] 1 Ch. 146.
These decisions must not be confused with Lord Cottenham's rule in
railroad cases, since abandoned, to the effect that where landowners with-
drew their opposition to the incorporation of a railroad company because
promised an especial benefit by the promoters, such as a station located
at a particular* point, the corporation could not refuse to carry out their
agreement, because its charter was procured partly through the withdrawal
of opposition in the agreement made by the promoters with the landowners,
of which it received the benefit and the obligation of which it could not
refuse to assume. Edwards v. Grand Junction Ry., 1 Myl. & C. 650 (1836) ;
overruled in effect in Caledonian & Dunbartonshire Ry. v. Helensburgh, 2
Macq. 391 (1856). Lord Cottenham's rule was re-enacted in substance by
Act of Parliament in 1864.
42See Gardiner v. Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 273 Fed. 441 (C. C. A.
2d, 1921), in which the Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the difference
between the American and English rules, stating that "the English Courts
hold that a contract made by promoters in behalf of a corporation projected,
but not formed, cannot, by adoption, bind the company when incorporated.
They hold that a new contract is necessary. The adoption and confirmation
by the deed of settlement, or its modern equivalent, the memorandum of
association, will not render the contract binding on the company." See also
Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co., 59 Mont. 469, 197 Pac. 1005 (1921).
43 See inf ra notes 59-86.
4 Supra note 41.
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half. . . . Ratification can only take effect in law by
referring it to some previous mandate, and a previous man-
date is an incident which arises only in the relation of prin-
cipal and agent. There have been many attempts to make
persons liable by what is called adoption of a contract . . .
and such attempts have always failed. A leading type of
such class of cases are those where it has been sought to
make companies liable for contracts entered into by pro-
moters."
Such is the rule in England, and it has been followed almost
without variation. The courts there, as they reluctantly admit,
have been unable to find any logical reason for excepting these
cases from the general rules of contract law, which superficially
are completely applicable. The fact that the equities of the
situation demand a decision which modifies the rule has not in-
fluenced them.
In re Dale & Plant, Ltd.4 is one of the strictest of the English
decisions. There promoters of a future corporation employed
Bloomer as its secretary, in consideration of his agreeing to sub-
scribe to some of its stock. The articles of association signed by
Bloomer and the directors of the corporation, five of whom were
also its promoters, confirmed the agreement. Bloomer was then
employed by the corporation as secretary, at the salary stipulated
in the agreement. Upon the winding up of the company, prior
to the expiration of the agreed term of his employment, he
brought an action against it, both for arrears of salary and for
damages for breach of the contract. The court said rather help-
lessly:
"I do not see my way clear to helping the claimant, though
I would do so if I could. He was the secretary of the com-
pany and is entitled to remuneration for all the work he has
done; for that he is entitled to claim. But he asks for dam-
ages on the ground that he was really appointed secretary
for five years, and that his appointment was summarily
determined on the winding up of the company within five
years. "
The court continued:
"Instead of signing a new agreement on the same terms
between themselves and Bloomer, they contented themselves
with doing this: On the 10th of November they passed a
resolution 'confirming the agreement of the 13th of Octo-
ber, 1886,' between A. J. Bloomer and the company. Now
there was no agreemeit between Bloomer and the company
at all, but between Bloomer and the promoters. The direc-
tors had no power to confirm the agreement. What they




in the same terms. Therefore, that resolution was an
invalid attempt on their part to ratify an agreement which
they were incapable of ratifying."
The claim for arrears of salary was allowed as on a qoiatum
meruit, but the claim for damages for breach of the five year
contract was disallowed.
There are many other English decisions of a similar nature.
These are more frequently cases in which recovery on contracts
to pay for legal or other services incidental to incorporation
was denied, even though the contracts were expressly confirmed
by the corporation subsequent to organization.
In Melhado v. Porto Alegre,-6 the articles of association of
the defendant railroad company provided that all expenses and
charges incurred in the formation of the company should be paid
by it, not to exceed £2000. The promoters sued the company
for that amount. Lord Coleridge in holding for the defendant
said:
"With some reluctance I have come to the conclusion that
the defendants are entitled to our judgment; for if a com-
pany derives advantage from expenditures incurred upon
its behalf, before its incorporation, it is desirable that it
should be held liable to repay those who have aided in its
formation; but upon reflection, I cannot find any ground
upon which the defendants can succeed at law."
The plaintiffs, the promoters, relied on the terms of the
articles of association as establishing their case, but the court
held that they could not base their suit on these articles to which
they were not parties.
In another English case,47 the court went so far as to hold the
corporation not liable, where in the articles of association it was
agreed that solicitors' fees for professional services incidental to
incorporation were to be paid, which agreement the directors of
the organized company subsequently expressly ratified. The
court reasoned that the corporation could not ratify an agree-
ment made at a time when it was non-existent. Furthermore,
the solicitors were not parties to the articles of association or to
the so-called ratification by the directors. The court remarked
by *ay of dictum that the solicitors might have a claim against
the corporation on a qitantwam me-idt, an expression of opinion
frequent in this type of case. The courts are loth to think the
aggrieved party remediless4 8
The courts of Massachusetts have in most cases followed
461bid.
471n re National Motor Mail Coach, ibid.
4S Cf. In re Dale & Plant, ibid.
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the English rule.49 In Pennell v. Lothrop,10 a corporation pub-
lished books in accordance with a contract made with its pro-
moters, in which the author granted the future corporation the
right of exclusive publication on a royalty basis. There was an
assignment by the corporation for the benefit of creditors, and
the author made an independent arrangement with the assignee
for the publication of her books. The promoters joined with the
corporation and brought an action against the author on their
agreement with her. The court held that the corporation was
improperly joined as plaintiff. It was not a party to the con-
tract and had no interest in it. This case illustrates the manner
in which the application of a purely legalistic principle may de-
feat the intentions of the parties. It would have been logical and
apparently sound theoretically to hold the corporation a proper
party plaintiff, on the ground that it had adopted and ratified
the contract by publishing the author's books with knowledge of
the agreement.
As has been stated, in the majority of American jurisdictions
the corporation may become bound on the promoter's contracts
in several different ways. Here again our courts have made an
effort to adapt the law to the facts, and the apparent inquiry
has been, is it fair to exempt the corporation from liability, or
is the company, by resort to formal rules, attempting to evade
an obligation which it assumed both by apparent intent and act.,
As was stated by the Utah Supreme Court:
"It is contended by counsel for the appellant that a con-
tract made for a corporation, before it is in actual existence,
is not enforceable by or against it. This contention is too
broad. It indicates that a corporation cannot, even in the
exercise of its power to make contracts, accept and adopt a
contract made for it by the promoters, before its existence
as an entity. The legitimate consequence of this would be
that a corporation, upon full and complete organization un-
der the Statute, might accept and adopt such a contract,
receive and retain the benefits thereof, and at the same time
be absolved from its burden. We have no sympathy with a
doctrine that would lead to such results-that might be
employed as an instrument of fraud and injustice to the
unwary." 52
In the United States the rule enunciated in England has with
apparent sincerity been repeatedly stated as the existing law,
only to be distinguished and nullified in effect by the decision in
49Penn. Match Co. v. Hapgood, 141 Mass. 145, 7 N. E. 22 (1886); Abbott
v. Hapgood, 150 Mass. 248, 22 N. E. 907 (1889) ; Bradford v. Metcalf, 185
Mass. 205, 70 N. E. 40 (1904).
50191 Mass. 357, 77 N. E. 842 (1906).




the very case in which it is quoted52 Possibly the English man-
ner of disposing of these cases is ultimately the simpler one. The
promoter there, and those dealing with him, know just where he
stands in reference to liability on contracts made for proposed
corporations, while the status of the promoter's contracts in the
courts in this country, in spite of some so-called general rules,
is uncertain and speculative. It depends on whether the par-
ticular court has the mental perspective which subordinates the
theory of the inviolability of legal concepts to the dictates of
fairness and justice, or whether it is of an uncompromising
legalistic turn of mind which refuses to blur the fair, clearcut and
logical outlines of legal principles. For just as moral concepts
of "right" and "wrong" must vary, change and sometimes dis-
appear under the pressure of modern life, so legal principles
must also change and become less absolute and less dogmatic.
The cases in our courts are all in agreement in principle that
the promoter's contract is not binding on the corporation unless
either expressly or impliedly adopted by the organized corpora-
tion. An excellent and broad statement of the rule, so broad
indeed that it fits almost any situation, is contained in a Utah
case:
"It may be assumed as true that promoters have no stand-
ing in any relation to agency, since that which has no exist-
ence can have no agent, and in the absence of any act author-
izing them so to do, can enter into no contract, nor transact
any business which shall bind the proposed corporation after
it becomes a distinct entity, but notwithstanding this be
true, still such promoters and incorporators may, acting in
their individual capacities, make contracts in furtherance
of the incorporation and for its benefit, and, after the incor-
poration comes into being as an artificial person under the
forms of law, it may, at least under the weight of American
authority, accept and adopt such contracts and thereupon
they become its own contracts, and may be enforced by or
against it. This the corporation may do, not because of an
agency on the part of the incorporators, before the existence
of the entity, for there is none, but because of its own inher-
ent powers as a body corporate, to make contracts. More-
over the adoption of such a contract need not be by express
action of the corporation, entered on its minutes, but may
be inferred from its own acts and acquiescence, or those of
its agents, and there need be no express acceptance, or the
corporation may be bound by the contracts of its promoters,
if made so by its charter, which it has accepted and to which
it was agreed. Unless, however, there be an acceptance and
adoption thereof in some such way, the corporation will not,
52 Kridelbaugh v. Aldrehn Theatres Co., 195 Iowa 147, 191 N. W. 803
(1917); Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co., supra note 42.
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in general, be bound by the contracts of its promoters and
incorporators made for it before its complete organiza-
tion." 5
Mere incorporation does not of itself render the promoter's
contracts binding on the newly created company, and there must
be some affirmative act from which it can be inferred that the
corporation intended to obligate itself. The court said in a
recent leading case:
"It is our opinion that a promoter's contract as such can-
not upon any theory, ipso facto by the incorporation of the
company in contemplation, become the contract of the corpo-
ration. • The legal entity itself must act in its corporate
capacity before it shall be held liable. ... . 4
In a still later decision the court, in discussing the adoption of a
promoter's contract to pay for legal services rendered in con-
nection with incorporation and incidental matters, said very
forcefully:
"This is not a case in which the corporation can accept or
refuse the benefits of a contract. Under the instruction re-
ceived, it had no choice. Like a child at its birth, it must be
born in the manner provided. There is no volition on its
part." 'z
The corporation, however, was held liable in this case, for the
court decided that it had impliedly adopted the contract on an
entirely different ground.
It is ,only fair and logical that this should be the rule, for the
corporation could not with justice come into existence burdened
with the obligation to perform its promoter's promises. That
would be unfair to its stockholders and subsequent creditors, and
would destroy all distinction between the corporation and its
projectors. The application of such a rule would be disastrous,
as the promoter, because of the very nature of his occupation, is
an optimist and has the salesman's psychology. Promises are his
stock in trade, and it is through them and his confidence in their
fulfillment that he stimulates interest in the corporation, but
his dreams would become the corporation's chimeras if it were
bound to realize them. 6 Common sense and sound legal prin-
6 Wall v. Mining & Smelting Co., supra note 51, at 481, 59 Pac. at 400.
5 Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co., supra note 42, at 478, 197 Pac.
at 1007.
55 Kridelbaugh v. Aldrehn Theatres Co., supra note 52, at 149, 191 N. W.
at 804.
56See New York, N. H. & H. R. R. v. Ketchum, 27 Conn. 170 (1858);
Park v. Modern Woodsmen of America, 181 Ill. 214, 54 N. E. 932 (1899);
Rockford, Rock Island R. R. v. Sage, 65 Ill. 328 (1872); Cooix, CoMi'OPA-
TIONS (1923) § 707.
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ciples therefore accord in the rule that the corporation, is not
chargeable on promoters' agreements.
The rule that the corporation, under certain circumstances, is
bound is equally fair, for it makes effective the intention of the
parties. Whether the courts hold the agreement to be that of
the corporation by ratification, adoption, novation or acceptance
of benefits is often mere technical quibble. It is necessary, how-
ever, in order to understand the law in this country relative to
this subject to discuss these distinctions.
The corporation cannot "ratify" the promoter's agreements,
for it was not in existence to authorize them. In the words of
an Alabama case:
"In order, however, for the corporation to be bound by the
acts of its promoters, it must, after it comes into existence,
do some act which makes the contract binding on it; it is
sometimes said that it must ratify the contract, but strictly
speaking, it cannot and does not ratify. As pointed out by
the text-writers and judges, contracts made by the pro-
moters for the corporation to be organized cannot in law or
in equity be ratified by the corporation when it comes into
existence, because ratification implies at least the ex-
istence of a person or thing in whose behalf the contract
might have been made at the time it was made. Being in-
capable of binding the corporation when they were made,
for the all sufficient reason that the corporation then had
no existence, such contracts cannot afterwards be ratified
by the body." 57
In spite of thd fact that this logical reasoning has been adopted
and approved by our courts,c8 the important thing is that it is
possible for the corporation to become bound by the promoter's
contracts without formally making a new contract on the same
terms. Ratification and adoption are identical in effect, although
possibly susceptible of technical distinction.
The court recognized this in Schreyer v,. Turner Flourbzg
Co., a suit for money loaned to promoters, which the corpora-
tion subsequently promised to repay and probably used. The
court, in holding the corporation liable, discussed the application
of the so-called principles of ratification and adoption to pro-
moters' contracts:
'5 Stone v. Walker, 201 Ala. 130, 134, 77 So. 554, 558 (1917).
-5 See Buffington v. Bardon, 80 Wis. 635, 50 N. W. 776 (1891); Holyoke
Envelope Co. v. U. S. Envelope Co., 182 Mass. 171, 65 N. E. 54 (1902);
Huron v. Kittleson, 4 S. D. 520, 57 N. W. 233 (1902); Bond v. Atlantic
Terra Cotta Co., 137 App. Div. 671, 122 N. Y. Supp. 425 (1st Dep't 1910) ;
Dayton W. Valley & X Turnpike Co. v. Coy, 13 Ohio St. 84 (1864); Queen
City Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Crawford, 127 Mo. 356, 30 S. M. 163 (1895).
59 29 Ore. 1, 43 Pac. 719 (1896).
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"Now as regards a contract made or an obligation in-
curred by the promoters of a corporation in the name of, or
for and in behalf of a cbntemplated corporation, it would
seem that an adoption or a ratification thereof by the cor-
poration after it had developed into a legal entity would
mean one and the same thing and would be accomplished
by one and the same process. True the promoters cannot
be the agents of an unborn corporation; but where they
have assumed to act for it and to contract in its name, the
approval and confirmation of such acts by the corporation,
when organization has been duly accomplished, is but the
ratification of the acts of an unauthorized agent. And the
result is the same whether we call it 'adoption' or 'ratifica-
tion!." 60
In Queen City Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Crawford,61 the court
emphasizes the point that the corporation in adopting or ratify-
ing the promoters' contracts is held to be acting in the sdme
manner as it would in making an original contract-a slight
rationalization to sustain the cases, for original contracts could
hardly be made so informally.
It would be an impossible task to collate the decisions in which
promoters' contracts have been held adopted by the corporation
and to arrive at a general principle. They are legion and de-
cided on various theories. One of the most ingenious and nicely
applicable is that the third party's agreement with the promoter
is a mere continuing offer which may be accepted or rejected
by the organized corporation when it is ready to function.
The clearest statement of the law relative to this theory is con-
tained in a Utah case. There the conveyance to the corporation
was made in accordance with the promoters' contract. It was
claimed that the organized company was not bound to pay the
price specified in an agreement made at a time when the corpora-
tion was non-existent. In refusing to apply the strict rule, which
in this case would have been the evasion of an actual and in-
tended debt, the court said:
"Where a contract is made by and with promoters, which
is intended to inure to the benefit of a corporation about to
be organized, such contract will be regarded as in the nature
of an open offer which the corporation upon complete or-
ganization may accept and adopt or not as it chooses, but
if it does accept and adopt and retain the benefits of it, it
cannot reject any liability under it, but in such case will be
bound to perform the contract, upon the principle that one
who accepts and adopts a contract which another under-
60 Ibid. at 6, 43 Pac. at 721. See also Stanton v. New York 1.. R., 59
Conn. 285, 22 AtI. 300 (1890).
61127 Mo. 356, 30 S. W. 163 (1895).
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took to perform in his name and on his behalf, must take
the burden with the benefit." C-
In a Wisconsin case, the court in considering an agreement to
purchase lumber made by a promoter, who subsequently became
the superintendent of the defendant corporation, said:
"As indicated the contract originally existing between the
plaintiff, Jones, and Wyman, was, at the time the defendant
was organized and so far as it was concerned, a mere open
offer on the part of the plaintiff. The mere fact that Jones
had been a party to the original contract did not prevent
him, as superintendent, and in behalf of the defendant firm,
from accepting such offer and assuming such responsibil-
ity."26
There are many other cases which proceed on this ingenious
theory.64 This continuing offer, in fact, amounts to an agreement
by the third party with the promoter to keep his offer open for
acceptance by the corporation.
There are few, if any, cases in which the organized company
formally enters into a new contract on the terns of that made
by the promoter. It is also rare that the corporation's assent to
the agreement is definite or express. In most cases where a
promoter's contract has been held binding on the corporation,
it is because it has with knowledge of its terms derived some ben-
fit from the contract.
A leading case on this point is Rogers v. The Ncw Yoi* &
Texas LaM, Co.65 A corporation was formed to take over prop-
erty conveyed to trustees for the holders of the second mortgage
bonds of the Great Northern Railroad Company. A committee
devised a plan later adopted by the bondholders under which the
land was to be developed and marketed. The corporation was
6 2 Wall v. Niagara Mining & Smelting Co., snpra note 51, at 482, 59 Pac.
at 401.
63 Pratt v. Oshkosh Match Co., 89 Wis. 406, 410, 62 N. W. 84, 85 (1S95).
64 Hackbarth v. Wilson Lumber Co., 36 Idaho 628, 631, 212 Pac. 969
(1923) : "Several different legal theories have been advanced, some of which
have been subjected to criticism on logical grounds. The most logical theory
of liability to fit the case is that the proposal of one seeking to contract
with a corporation through its promoters should be regarded as a continuing
offer, which is accepted by the corporation by receiving the benefits after
it is organized, notwithstanding its acceptance in the first instance by the
promoters." Here the corporation was held liable on the promoters'
contract.
Holyoke Envelope Co. v. U. S. Envelope Co., szfpra note 58; Deschamps
v. Loiselle, 50 Mont. 565, 148 Pac. 335 (1915), and cases cited. This rule
has most frequently been applied to cases relating to stock subscriptions.
Until the corporation is formed, the promise of the subscriber is in the
nature of an open offer to the corporation.
65 134 N. Y. 197, 32 N. E. 27 (1892).
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organized, took title to the .property and issued stock in accord-
ance with the plan. The court said:
"The bondholders were the promoters of the land com-
pany. Being about to form a corporation for an authorized
purpose, they made an agreement upon the subject in which
they provided for benefits to be conferred upon it and bur-
dens to be assumed by it after its organization. While it
could have refused, when it came into existence, to accept
the one or to be bound by the other, it could not accept the
advantages and then refuse to assume the obligations. By
accepting title to the land it adopted and ratified the agree-
ment entered into by all its stockholders, and thereby vol-
untarily made itself a party thereto and became bound
thereby. The adoption by the land company of the contract
between the stockholders was a reasonable means of carry-
ing into effect its authorized objects, and, after knowingly
receiving the benefit of the arrangement, it cannot be per-
mitted to deny that it agreed to assume the corresponding
burdens."
A much cited federal case r1 holds that where the claimant,
pursuant to a contract with promoters of a future corporation,
actually assisted in procuring a valuable mining lease of which
the corporation, upon its organization, took an assignment, he
was entitled to the compensation specified in the agreement.
The court said succinctly: "If the corporation accepts the bene-
fits of the contract, it thereby adopts it."
It is apparent that a mere acceptance of the benefits of the
contract, without knowledge of its terms, is not sufficient to bind
the corporation. An analysis of the cases decided on the theory
of acceptance of benefits discloses that the majority of the cor-
porations involved were closely held, and that the promoters,
the directors and the stockholders were practically identical.
There are numerous illustrations of this. In a recent federal
case, 7 a firm of promoters agreed that a corporation to be
66 In re Ballou, 215 Fed. 810 (D. Ky. 1914). See also Girard v. Case
Bros. Cutlery Co., 225 Pa. 327, 74 Atl. 201 (1909). There it was held that
the plaintiff, employed under an agreement with the promoters and dis-
charged after working for the corporation at the salary specified in the
agreement, was entitled to receive from the corporation the stock promised
him by the promoters. His employment by the corporation was an adoption
of the agreement, particularly as the promoters were the majority stock-
holders of the corporation.
See further Smith v. Parker, 148 Ind. 127, 45 N. E. 770 (1897). Cf.
Bank of Forest v. Orgile Bros. & Co., 82 Miss. 81, 34 So. 325 (1903),
where a safe was delivered to the bank on the order of the promoter; the
court said that there must be an adoption of or acceptance of the benefits
of the contract to render the defendant liable. The facts in this case were
not sufficient to infer either adoption or acceptance.




organized would take over oil fields which the plaintiff Wiltsee,
a man of some experience, agreed to bring in. Valuable proper-
ties discovered by him were taken over by the organized cor-
poration, which refused to transfer to him the stock specified
in the agreement as compensation. The plaintiff, said the court,
was entitled to recover the value of the stock from the corpora-
tion, for the promoters and the corporation were one and the
same, and the promoters had complete knowledge of the agree-
ment. The organized company was held liable on the contract
since it had knowingly accepted its benefits.
In Br uauigam v. Dean & Co.,CS the members of a partnership,
promoters of a corporation, became the sole owners of its stock.
The partnership contracted with the plaintiff, in consideration
of his investing $10,000 in the stock of the future corporation,
to employ him for five years at a stipulated salary. Subse-
quently the corporation employed the plaintiff and issued stock
to him as provided in the promoters' contract, which it refused
to sign. The court held that there were sufficient facts from
which a ratification of the contract might be inferred, since the
plaintiff's services had been accepted by the corporation. The
owners of all the stock of the corporation and the promoters were
identical, and their knowledge of the agreement was its knowl-
edge. Again in Morgan v. Bon Bon Co., "' a leading New York
case, the officers and the promoters of the defendant company
were identical. It was held that when the plaintiff was permitted
to perform services for the corporation in accordance with a
contract with the promoters he was entitled to recover under
it from the corporation.
Another case of the same type is In re Acadia Dairics." There
a promoter representing the bondholders of a corporation bought
in its property on a receiver's sale. He had agreed with the
bondholders that if he acquired the property he would organize
a new corporation, the bonds of which were to be issued to them
in the same proportion as their former holdings. The company
was organized and took over the property. The court said in
sustaining the claims of the bondholders as a valid prior lien
on the property of the new corporation: "Cook was its organizer
and promoter and, as stated, its sole owzer. His knowledge was
its knowledge. The two directors whom he selected to act with
him had the same knowledge." Since the corporation had taken
over the property, the court held that it had adopted the agree-
ment authorizing the mortgage and the bonds.
63 85 N. J. L. 549, 89 AtI. 760 (1914), aff'd, 86 N. J. L. 67, 92 Ati. 344
(1914).
I 222 N. Y. 22, 118 N. E. 205 (1917); see Outing Kumfy Kab Co. v.
Ivey, 74 Ind. App. 286, 125 N. E. 234 (1919).
70135 Atl. 846 (Del. Ch. 1927).
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In Battelle v. Northwestern Cement & Concrete Pavement
Co., 71 real property was conveyed to a corporation in accordance
with the agreement of the promoters. The action was brought
against the corporation for a deficiency on a mortgage on the
property, which the promoters had agreed the corporation
would assume. The court overruled the defendant's claim that
it was not liable on the contract, stating that adoption need not
be express and need not require greater formality than if the
agreement were a new agreement made by the corporation. The
highest degree of fairness is required in cases of this character,
the court commented; the property had been used, and every
stockholder, director and officer knew that it was conveyed to
the corporation with the understanding that the corporation was
to assume and pay the debt to which the property was sub-
jected.7 2
It is natural that the rule holding corporations bound on pro-
moters' contracts by reason of accepting the benefits thereof is
applied most frequently to close corporations. As is apparent,
one of the essential elements of real assent to a contract is
knowledge of its terms, and where the promoters and the cor-
poration are identical, that knowledge is easily inferred, and
the corporation can be held liable on the contract. The rule is
applicable to any corporation, if its knowledge of the terms of
the promoters' contract can be established. This might some-
times be a difficult matter.73
The first part of this article treated of the rights and liabilities
of the promoter on contracts made for future corporations.
Frequently, as was stated, the promoter is released by the adop-
tion of the contract by the corporation. If it is necessary to
find a formula to sustain these decisions it may be that the
corporation can be held to become liable on the contract by nova-
tion. As Professor Williston says:
"The cases generally speak of the obligation of the cor-
poration as created by adoption, but novation seems the
more accurate term. If the assent of the corporation to the
bargain is merely an adoption of it, the promoter apparently
must still remain liable. But it seems more nearly to corre-
spond with the intentions of the parties to suppose that
"1 37 Minn. 89, 33 N. W. 327 (1887).
72 In Transport Utilitor Sales Co. v. Zwergel, 228 Mich. 132, 199 N. W.
668 (1924), the corporation was permitted to sue its salesmanager for
advances made to him under a contract with its promoter. It was hold
that the corporation had adopted the agreement by continuing to employ
him on its terms. Other cases of close corporations include Fairbanks v.
Merchants & Consumers Market House Ass'n, 199 Mo. App. 317, 202 S. W.
596 (1918); Lewes v. Breakwater Fisheries Co., 13 Del. 234, 117 Atl. 823
(1922).
73In re Ideal Steel Wheel Co., 25 F. (2d) 651 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928);
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when the corporation assents to the contract, it assents to
take the place of the promoter, a change of parties to which
the other side of the contract assented in advance." "
It is a little artificial perhaps to say that the parties intended
that the promoter should be released when the corporation
assented to the contract, for the parties probably assumed to
bind the corporation at the outset, and almost certainly did not
know that the promoters were personally bound, until difficulties
arose and the advice of counsel was sought.
A recent federal case might easily have been decided expressly
on Professor Williston's theory.75 Here the agreement made
prior to the organization of a corporation by the owner of all
of its stock was definitely assumed by the company by the sub-
stitution of its notes for individual notes. The corporate notes
were apparently accepted as fulfilling the contract.
Chicaigo Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Talbotton Crea cry & Mfg. Co."
also appears to be a case to which the theory of novation might
readily be applied. Here the plaintiff contracted with the pro-
moters to build a factory. They were to obtain a charter for a
corporation, in which each of the promoters was to be interested
to the extent of his liability on the contract. The corporation
was organized and took over the property. The court, in holding
that there was a cause of action against the corporation and not
against the promoters, said:
"It is true that the suit is against the corporation and
not against the individuals who subscribed to the contract,
but the iexistence of the corporation sued was in contempla-
tion of the parties when they made the contract; and taking
the contract as a whole, it was clearly the intention of both
palties thereto that the plaintiff, when it complied with its
contract, and the amount specified by the contract became
due, should have a right to proceed against the corporation
which was to be formed, to carry out the enterprise con-
templated by the contract; and if the parties of the second
part failed, neglected or refused to have themselves incor-
porated, that their liability to the plaintiff was to be as
individuals, each one being responsible for the amount set
opposite his name. It being alleged that the corporation has
been formed in conformity to the contract, it would seem
that the right of action of the plaintiff against the individu-
als does not now exist, and that the only right which it has
is to sue the artificial person, which the contract provided
Shaffer v. Mohawk Valley Co., 221 N. Y. 697, 117 N. E. 1084 (1917); ceM
facts of cases cited supra notes 65-72.
74 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 306.
75 Rahway National Bank v. Thompson, 7 F. (2d) 419 (C. C. -. 3d, 1925).
76106 Ga. 84, 31 S. E. 809 (1898).
1037
YALE LAW JOURNAL
for, and which when brought into being was to take the
place of the natural persons who had agreed to form it." 71
While the court did not emphasize the fact, it will be noted that
the corporation took over the property.
If every case which involved promoters' contracts was decided
in this manner, it would be easy to conclude that the court had
based its conclusion on the theory of an implied novation. How-
ever, where the court's decision is not made on the novation
theory, .or where it does not appear that the basis of the decision
was that the corporation accepted the benefits of the contract,
the contract has frequently been held adopted. The corporation
it is reasoned makes the agreement its own by assenting to it in
some manner. A few much quoted cases illustrate this.
The United States Supreme Court considered this question,
rather superficially it is true, in Whitney v. Wyman."' The pro-
moters of a corporation contracted to purchase machinery for
it from the plaintiff. The corporation received the machinery,
and the plaintiff brought this action to recover the price. In
answer to the objection that the agreement was not binding on
the corporation, the Court stated:
"It is said the corporation at the date of these letters [the
contract in suit] was forbidden to do any business, not hav-
ing filed its articles of association as required by the Statute.
To this objection there are several answers. The corpora-
tion subsequently ratified the contract by organizing and
treating it as valid. This made it in all respects what it
would have been if the requisite corporate power had ex-
isted when it was entered into."
The corporation's assent to the contract was here implied from
its acquiescence in its terms.
In Oakes v. Cattaraugus Water Co., '" a case which is most
frequently cited, the active promoter of the proposed Cattarau-
gus Water Company agreed to pay the plaintiff $1,000 for
securing a right of way, and assisting in the financing of the
77 Ibid. at 89, 31 S.' E. at 812. See also International Agricultural Corp.
v. Carpenter, 190 App. Div. 359, 179 N. Y. Supp. 819 (1st Dep't 1920).
-"8 101 U. S. 392 (1879).
79 143 N. Y. 430, 38 N. E. 461 (1894). See also Chase v. Redfleld
Creamery Co., 12 S. D. 529, 81 N. W. 951 (1900) ; of. Horowitz v. Broads
Mfg. Co., 54 Misc. 569, 104' N. Y. Supp. 988 (Sup. Ct. 1907), in which a
contracb of employment was made with the president of a corporation,
prior to organization. Although the employee subsequently worked for the
corporation, with the president's knowledge, the corporation was hold not
bound by the contract. The corporation and its president were distinct
entities, said the court. This case can be distinguished from the Oakes
case, for when the contract of employment was made, nothing was said
about the proposed incorporation.
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company. The contract was made about two months before the
corporation's organization was perfected. The trial court non-
suited the plaintiff on the ground that because of this it was
not binding on the corporation. It appeared that the plaintiff
performed the services agreed upon at the request of the corpo-
ration's president, the promoter who had originally made the
contract with him. The New York Court of Appeals said, in
reversing the judgment, that the contract in suit was within the
president's general powers, and that if it was his intention to
adopt the agreement by acknowledging the indebtedness under
it, as the evidence showed, the corporation became bound by his
action, for his act was the corporation's.
Brownholtz v. The Providers Life Assurance Co.6 is one of
the cases in which the court, rather forcing the facts of the
case, based its opinion on the theory that a new contract on the
terms of the promoter's contract was entered into between the
parties. A promoter, subsequently elected president of the or-
ganized corporation, agreed to employ the plaintiff as superin-
tendent for the projected company. The usual defense that the
corporation was not in existence at the time of the contract
was interposed. The corporation by a resolution of its directors
specifically ratified every act of its president before incorpora-
tion. The plaintiff performed services for the organized com-
pany. The court said that the contract was mutually binding
from the date of the organization of the corporation.
"Here the suit is upon a contract that came into being
after the defendant filed its charter. We do not hold that
any contract existed before the defendant was chartered, but
the acts of the directors and the conduct of the plaintiff
constituted the making of the contract, the terms of which
were set forth in the document which had been prepared and,
signed before. Both parties were entitled to adopt the con-
tents of any instrument as constituting the terms of a
contract between them."
MeArthur v. Times Printing Co.81 states the rule with a
clarity some times absent in other cases. The plaintiff had been
employed to solicit advertising for the defendant by a contract
made with one of its promoters. The plaintiff performed serv-
ices for the company for about six months after incorporation.
The defendant was held liable on the contract. The court said:
"This court, in accordance with what we deem sound
reasoning as well as the weight of authority, has held that
while a corporation is not bound by engagements made on
its behalf by its promoters before its organization, it may
so 236 Ill. App. 494 (1925) 2
L1 48 Minn. 319, 51 N. W. 216 (1892).
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after its organization make such engagements its own con-
tracts. And this it may do precisely as it might make
similar original contracts, formal action of its board of
directors being necessary only where it would be necessary
in the case of a similar original contract. That it is not
requisite that such adoption or acceptance be expressed, but
it may be inferred from acts or acquiescence on the part of
the corporation or its authorized agents any similar original
contract might be shown. . . . Of course the agreement
must be one which the corporation itself could make and
one which the usual agents of the corporation have express
or implied authority to make."
This is an intelligent and legally sound opinion. Its application,
however, has definite limitations. It could not be applied to
contracts which require specific authorization.
An interesting case in which the promoter's contract was
expressly adopted is Boyd v. Michael.82 Here a loan was. made
to the sole promoter of a contemplated corporation. It was
agreed that a corporate note was to be given for the loan. The
minutes of the meeting of the incorporators confirmed this
arrangement, the plaintiff lender signing them. The corporation
was, of course, held to have assented to the contract. The facts
in this case might even be sufficient to satisfy the English and
Massachusetts rule, for the lender here was actually a party to
the contract of adoption, as set forth in the minutes of the
incorporators.
In the Lance Lumber Co. case,83 the organizing promoter of a
corporation agreed to purchase lumber, giving his individual
notes with the understanding that corporate notes were later to
be substituted. The corporation was subsequently organized and
paid part of the stipulated price of the lumber and renewed the
notes. The assent of the corporation to the contract, it was held,
could be implied from the payments made by it, and the renewals
of the notes.
In some cases the courts have disposed of the situation with
,easy insouciance. In re Quality Shoe Shop 1; illustrates this.
'Here we have the familiar picture of a family-held corporation.
'Cohn ran the Quality Shoe Shop, taking a lease of the premises
-with the intention of incorporating, which he subsequently did.
8222 F. (2d) 480 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
-
3 Webber v. Lance Co., 237 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916); see also for
cases of adoption by acquiescence (implied or express) : Belfast v. Belfast
Water Co., 115 Me. 234, 98 Atl. 738 (1916); Streator & Independent Tel.
Co. v. Continental Construction Co., 217 Ill. 577, 75 N. E. 546 (1905);
Castorland Milk & Cheese Co. v. Shantz, 179 N. Y. Supp. 131 (Sup. Ct.
1919); Paxton Cattle Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 21 Neb. 621 (1887); Mulvor-
hill v. Vicksburg Ry., 88 Miss. 689, 40 So. 647 (1906); of. Ireland v. Globe
Milling & Reduction Co., 20 R. I. 190, 38 Atl. 116 (1897).
84 212 Fed. 321 (D. Pa. 1914).
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His wife paid the first month's rent before organization. The
corporation repaid her and continued to pay the rent. The
stockholders and directors of the corporation were Cohn's wife,
his son and son-in-law. The court said that this was a clear
case of ratification, commenting, perhaps too confidently:
"That the corporation could ratify this previously unau-
thorized act done for its benefit is a proposition that needs
no citation of authority to support it and that such ratifica-
tion might be proved by the company's conduct as completely
as by a formal corporate act is I think equally plain."
This decision is a correct one. The court in arriving at its
conclusion did not consider the refinements as to whether a
promoter's contract can be ratified, but simply assumed that it
can, and decided the case accordingly.
The decision in a recent case disregards all legal rules and
simply proceeds pragmatically on a theory of its own.r' Here
the contract to purchase a tobacco by-product was made on
behalf of a projected corporation by the promoters. The cor-
poration later acted in accordance with the contract. The
defense was that the contract was not binding, as the corporation
was not a party to it. The court said succinctly, making its
own law:
"The contract of July 17th, 1899, in contemplation of the
parties thereto was as much for the benefit of the new
company, which that contract provided should be organized,
as for the benefit of those signing the instrument, and under
the generally recognized rule in this country, where a con-
tract between the parties is for the benefit of a third party,
such third party by appropriate action may enforce any
right secured to it by such contract, even though such third
party were not in existence at the time of the execution of
the contract."
Another illustration of the loose manner in which courts some-
times reason in reference to promoters' contracts is found in
Kridelbaugh v. Aldrehn Thkeatres Co.s The plaintiff, an attor-
ney, procured a charter for the defendant at the request of the
promoters, who afterwards became the corporation's only direc-
tors. The court held that the corporation did not become liable
on the contract by incorporation alone, stating, "It is immaterial
that the promoters thereafter became officers of the corporation.
The act of a promoter is not the act of the corporation." But
the court did manage to hold the corporation liable on the con-
tract, because one of the directors, at a meeting, told the attor-




ney that if he would procure a permit to sell the corporate stock,
they would pay for his services out of the proceeds. This, the
court concluded, constituted an authorization and recognition of
his past services, particularly as the board of directors and the
promoters were identical. This, obviously, is an inconsistently
reasoned case. Certainly what the directors said at the meeting
would not, under ordinary circumstances, be held sufficient to
bind the corporation, and the real basis of the decision was of
course that the promoters and the corporation were identical.
Although, as has been stated, the American courts generally
hold that the corporation may expressly or impliedly make the
promoters' contract its own, there are many exceptions to this
rule, exceptions which cannot be distinguished from exactly con-
trary decisions. An interesting illustration of this is found in
the two cases of Dayton W. Valley & X Turnpike Co. v. Coy 87
and Bloom v. Home Insurance Co.88 In the former case a con-
tract was entered into by the promoters of a projected corpora-
tion and the owner of land, that if the corporation would locate
a road over his property, he would construct a turnpike or sub-
scribe for stock in an amount sufficient to pay for its construc-
tion. The corporation was organized, caused the road to be
located as agreed and requested the defendant to build the turn-
pike, which he refused to do. The corporation built the turnpike,
tendered stock to the defendant and requested payment as speci-
fied in his agreement with the promoters. A judgment sustain-
ing the demurrer to the corporation's complaint was affirmed on
:appeal. The agreement was unenforceable, said the court,
because it lacked mutuality, since at its inception it was not
binding on the non-existent corporation, and, therefore, could
not be binding on the defendant.
The plaintiff Insurance Company in the second case was
organized by several insurance agencies, which agreed that they
would not compete individually with the corporation which they
proposed to organize. The new company subsequently took
,over all the contracting agencies. One of them, a party to the
contract of promotion, broke it by independently engaging in
the insurance business. The court said:
"It is urged, because the Home Insurance Company was
not incorporated and therefore not in existence at the
making of the contract, that there was a lack of mutuality,
and the contract is not effective on that account. But a
promise that lacks mutuality at its inception becomes bind-
ing on the promisor after performance by the promisee.
Where, therefore, a corporation after its organization makes
a contract by adopting and acting on it, the original contract
8 Supra note 58.
88 91 Ark. 367, 121 S. W. 293 (1909).
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becomes binding on it; and where all the parties after such
organization recognize and act on the original contract, all
parties to it are bound by its terms."
The Insurance Company was granted an injunction against the
refractory agent.
New York, N. H. & H. R. R. v. Ketckuna 6 is an unusual case.
Before the plaintiff's organization, Ketchum made successful
efforts of an extraordinary character to secure subscriptions to
its stock, apparently expecting remuneration, to the knowledge
of the promoters. The railroad company in recognition of these
services and after discussing the matter with the defendant
voted him and his family free transportation during his life on
the line. Later this privilege was rescinded. Suit was brought
by the railroad company to recover from Ketchum fares he
should have paid from the time of the cancellation of the priv-
ilege. The plaintiff claimed a contract by the promoters to
compensate him, subsequently adopted by the corporation. The
court held that the privilege granted to the defendant was a
mere gratuity, and that there was no contract with him which
could be ratified, for a corporation cannot be held to have come
into existence burdened with charges of this character, and it
would be inequitable to require it.
In an Indiana case 1' the court also refused to recognize the
promoters' contract as that of the corporation. The court had
under consideration the usual promoter's suit for compensation
for securing stock subscriptions, which the promoters had agreed
that the corporation would pay. The contention was that the
corporation had adopted the contract by accepting the subscrip-
tions. The comment made, in deciding for the defendant, was:
"It is difficult to understand how the corporation could
be estopped by accepting benefits which it had no power to
reject without uncreating itself."
In Rockford & Rock Isla, & St. Louis R. R. v,. Sage,0' a
director of the corporation had performed services for it prior
to its organization, the benefits of which it had accepted. The
decision of the court, holding the promoters' contract to remu-
nerate the plaintiff not binding, is at variance with the majority
of American cases.
"We are disposed to deny the right of recovery for
such services and expenses upon any implication resulting
from the facts .-.. A right of recovery against a cor-
s9 Supra note 56.
9o Cushion Heel Shoe Co. v. Hartt, 181 Ind. 167, 103 N. E. 1063 (1914).
'1'65 fl1. 328 (1872).
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poration for anything due before it had a proper exist-
ence does not appear to rest on any very satisfactory
legal principle. It appears more reasonable to hold any
services performed or expenses incurred prior to the or-
ganization of a corporation to have been gratuitous, in
view of the general good or private benefit expected to result
from the object of the corporation. It seems unjust to
stockholders, who subscribe and pay for the stock in a cor-
poration, that their property should be subject to the
incumbrances of such claims, which they had no voice in
creating."
A recent leading case, Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co.,"
also runs contrary to the general rule. After delivering an
excellent opinion which summarizes the law relative to the man-
ner of the adoption of promoters' contracts, the court finally
rejected the claim. The plaintiff, a promoter, contracted with
parties who were to convey land to a proposed corporation, for
which they were to receive its stock. The promoter was to
have alloted to him ten per cent of the stock of the organized
company as his commission in stock or in cash. In a suit for
this ten per cent, it was the plaintiff's contention that the cor-
poration had adopted the contract by accepting the proceeds of
stock sold by his efforts and by issuing stock in accordance with
orders obtained by him, and that the usual law of contracts
relative to novation and substitution has been abrogated as
regards promoters' contracts. The court overruled this claim,
stating that in order to bind the corporation some affirmative
action must be taken by the corporation itself in recognition
of the contract, and none was taken here. The promoter's
services must be recognized expressly, said the bourt, and silence
will not bind the corporation. In addition it was held that the
contract was ultra vires, for under the statute the stock could
not be issued for anything but full value.9 3
A federal case, Weiss v. Arnold Print Works, 4 seems to follow
the English rule, or is based merely on cold and correct theory.
The court itself illustrated its decision by the following hypo-
thetical case: "If A agrees to secure the employment of B by C,
and C does not employ B, B has no cause of action against C.
92Supra note 42.
93 A corporation is not permitted to interpose the defense of ultra vtires
to contracts of which it has received the benefits. This, of course, would
apply to promoters' contracts adopted by a corporation.
In Bobzin v. Gould Balance Valve, 140 Iowa 744, 118 N. W. 40 (1908),
subscriptions to stock of the defendant corporation were made in con-
sideration of the promoters agreeing to locate its main office in the
subscribers' city. It was held that though this contract might be ultra
vires, it was binding on the corporation which had received the benefit of
the agreement.
94188 Fed. 688 (S. D. N. Y. 1911).
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In order to hold C, it must be shown that he was a party to the
contract. If B does work for C with the latter's knowledge and
consent, C might be sued upon a quviztum incrcut for the value
of B's services, and not upon a contract for the reason that C
has made no contract."
Whether sufficient facts exist in any case to constitute a rati-
fication or adoption of the promoter's contract is a question of
fact for the jury.
In Chesbrough v. North Second Street Raflway Compo.ny,9
where the question arose whether by issuing stock to the lessor
the corporation had ratified an agreement to lease franchises,
the court held that it was error to dismiss the complaint, for the
question whether the defendant corporation had ratified the
agreement made by the promoter was for the jury.
In Moridrity v. Meyer,06 a lease was entered into by promoters
who intended to organize a bank. After the formation of the
bank, its safe was placed in the leased premises. The facts found
by the trial court were held not sufficient as a matter of law to
prove an intention on the part of the corporation to assume the
lease. The appellate court held itself without power to review
the decision, for whether there is an intention to assume the
contract in cases of this character is always a question of fact.
In considering the adoption of promoters' contracts by cor-
porations, it seems hardly necessary to add that the corporation
cannot be held bound on a promoter's contract beyond its cor-
porate powers, just as it cannot be held liable on an original
agreement of a similar nature.0 7
At the conclusion of this article the reader may well ask,
wearily, what is the law of promoters' contracts? What fair
generalization can be arrived at from this mass of conflicting
cases? An answer in the form of a statement of definite and
inviolable principles is impossible. Promoters' contracts are
distinctive in character, and questions relating to their interpre-
tation, operation and effect are not readily solved by the general
rules of contract law. Resorting to fixed rules in passing on
these cases is ordinarily a perfunctory and mechanical process
adhered to as a part of the accepted technique of judicial deci-
sions. It would be simpler if the courts, instead of rationalizing
by using formal theories of contract law to sustain their
conclusions, arrived at the legal effect of promoters' contracts
by a careful consideration of the apparent intent of the parties.
It must be conceded, however, that if the courts decided these
0: 5 N. Y. Week. Dig. 393 (1877).
0621 N. M. 521, 157 Pac. 652 (1916); see Sherl v. Bayer, Pretzfelder &
Mills, 213 App. Div. 587, 210 N. Y. Supp. 816 (Sup. CL 1925).
97 Kirkup %. Anaconda Amusement Co., supra note 52; Schreyer v. Turner
Flouring Co., s:pra note 59.
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cases entirely on the facts and without reference to established
theories, the scholars and the bar as a whole would not be
satisfied, but would painstakingly glean a general principle from
the decisions, and then triumphantly assign that principle to
its supposed place among the established theories of contract
law.
The law of promoters' contracts reflects the frequent and often
subconscious conflict in the rationale of judicial decisions, be-
tween the dictates of formal rules and principles on the one hand,
and the requirements of fairness and the intentions of the parties
on the other. Judge Cardozo presents this conflict with his
usual philosophic detachment.
"If we figure stability and progress as opposite poles, then
at one pole we have the maxim of stare decisis and the
method of decision by the tool of a deductive logic; at the
other we have the method which subordinates origins to
ends. The one emphasizes considerations of uniformity and
symmetry, and follows fundamental conceptions to ultimate
conclusions. The other gives freer play to considerations
of equity and justice, and the value to society of the interests
affected. The one searches for the analogy that is nearest
in point of similarity, and adheres to it inflexibly. The
other, in its choice of the analogy that shall govern, finds
community of spirit more significant than resemblance in
externals." Is
This conflict in cases of promoters' contracts generally results
in a victory for the demands of business usage, common sense
and justice. It is, however, rather a critical commentary on our
present system, that the courts are unable to admit frankly the
motivating force of their decisions in cases involving promoters'
contracts, but must, by artificial reasoning, insist instead on the
application of technical rules of law. This process nullifies the
salutary effect of these modern decisions as precedents and
tends to weaken the very rules of law which they seek to uphold.
98 CADozo, THE PARADOXES or LEGAL SCIENCE (1928) 8.
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